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ABSTRACT
Public  policy  debates  and  theoretical  disputes  motivate  this  paper’s  examination  of  (i)  the
relationship between bank concentration and banking system fragility and (ii) the mechanisms
underlying this relationship.  We find no support for the view that concentration increases the
fragility of banks.  Rather, banking system concentration is associated with a lower probability that
the country suffers a systemic banking crisis.  In terms of policies, we find that (i) regulations and
institutions that facilitate competition in banking are associated with less ￿ not more -- banking
system  fragility  and  (ii)  including  these  policy  indicators  does  not  change  the  results  on
concentration.  This suggests that concentration is a proxy for something else besides the competitive
environment.  Also, we do not find that official capital regulations, reserve requirements, or official
prudential regulations lower crises probabilities.  Finally, we present suggestive evidence that
concentrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks, which may help account
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I. Purposes & Motivation 
  Public policy debates and theoretical disputes motivate this paper’s examination of the 
relationship between bank concentration and banking system fragility and the mechanisms 
underlying this relationship.  The rapid consolidation of banks around the world is intensifying 
concerns among policymakers about bank concentration, as reflected in major reports by the 
Bank for International Settlements (2001), International Monetary Fund (2001), and the Group of 
Ten (2001).  These reports note that concentration may reduce competition in and access to 
financial services, increase the market power and political influence of financial conglomerates, 
and destabilize financial systems as banks become too big to discipline and use their influence to 
shape banking regulations and policies.  These reports also provide countervailing arguments.  
Consolidation may improve banking system efficiency and enhance stability as the best banks 
succeed, diversify, and boost franchise value.  Further, some may question whether bank 
concentration is a reliable indicator of competition in the banking industry.  
Theoretical disputes parallel these public policy deliberations.  Some models yield a 
“concentration-stability” prediction that banking system concentration reduces fragility (Allen 
and Gale, 2000, 2003).  In terms of mechanisms, concentration may signal less competition and 
hence greater market power and profits.  Higher profits provide a “buffer” against adverse 
shocks and increase the franchise value of the bank, which reduces incentives for bankers to take 
excessive risk.
1  Also, some hold that it is substantially easier for supervisors to monitor a few 
banks in a concentrated banking system than it is to monitor lots of banks in a diffuse banking 
                                                 
1 See Boot and Greenbaum (1993), Besanko and Thakor (1993), Hellman, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000), and 
Matutes and Vives (2000). Also, Smith (1984) shows that less competition in banking leads to more stability if 
information about the probability distribution of depositors’ liquidity needs is private and lower competition allows 
banking relationships to endure for longer periods. Matutes and Vives (1996), however, argue that concentration is 
not a consistent signal of competition, so that bank illiquidity can arise in any market structure.  
  1system, so that in equilibrium, concentrated banking systems will suffer fewer banking crises.  
Some proponents of the “concentration-stability” view note that if (i) concentrated banking 
systems have larger banks and (ii) larger banks hold more diversified portfolios than smaller 
banks, then concentrated banking systems will tend to be more stable.
2  
In contrast, some models produce a “concentration-fragility” prediction, where 
concentration increases fragility. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) stress that banks in less 
competitive environments charge higher interest rates to firms, which induces firms to assume 
greater risk.  Their model predicts that if concentration is positively associated with banks having 
market power, then concentration will increase both the expected rate of return on bank assets 
and the standard deviation of those returns.  Also, proponents of the concentration-fragility view 
disagree with the proposition that a few large banks are easier to monitor than many small banks.  
If size is positively correlated with complexity, then large banks may be more difficult to 
monitor than small banks, not less.  Finally, some researchers argue that larger banks are 
protected by implicit “too big to fail” policies that small banks do not enjoy.  This protection 
intensifies risk-taking incentives beyond any diversification advantages enjoyed by large banks 
(Boyd and Runkle, 1992; Mishkin, 1999; O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).
3  From this perspective, 
                                                 
2 Each of these conditions is debatable.  Models by Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and 
Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986), Allen (1990), and others predict economies of scale in intermediation.  As 
discussed by Calomiris (2000) and Calomiris and Mason (2000), research finds an inverse relationship between 
bank size and bank failure in the United States.  However, Chong (1991) and Hughes and Mester (1998) indicate 
that bank consolidation tends to increase the risk of bank portfolios.  Moreover, Boyd and Runkle (1993) examine 
122 U.S. bank holding companies and find an inverse relationship between size and the volatility of assets returns, 
but not evidence that large banks fail less frequently than small banks.  In contrast, De Nicolo (2000) finds a positive 
relationship between bank size and the probability that the bank will fail in the U.S., Japan, and several European 
countries.  We control for bank size in our regressions, but the focus of our research is on the relationship between 
the concentration and fragility of national banking systems. 
3 A large literature indicates that implicit or explicit deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to increase risk 
(e.g. Merton (1977), Sharpe (1978), Flannery (1989), Kane (1989), and Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992)).  If 
this insurance were the same for banks of all sizes, these models would predict no relationship between bank size 
and bank fragility.  Since regulators may fear potential macroeconomic consequences of large bank failures, many 
countries have implicit “too large to fail” policies that protect large banks more than small banks.  Thus, the largest 
banks frequently receive a greater net insurance subsidy from the government.  This subsidy may in turn increase the 
  2concentrated banking systems with a few large banks will tend to be more fragile than diffuse 
banking system with many small banks.  
Given these conflicting theoretical predictions and policy disputes, there are surprisingly 
few cross-country examinations of banking system concentration and fragility.
4  Although there 
is a growing cross-country empirical literature that uses time-series data to examine the 
determinants of banking crises, this research does not examine concentration (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998, 1999, henceforth DD; Gonazles-Hermosillo, et al., 1997; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999). Although Barth et al. (2004) examine the relationship between bank regulations 
and crises, they do not examine bank concentration and they use pure cross-country comparisons 
rather than panel analyses.  De Nicolo et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between banking 
system concentration and the fragility of the largest five banks in a country.  They do not, 
however, examine systemic crises. 
This paper (1) assesses the relationship between bank concentration and the probability 
that a country will suffer a “systemic” crisis and (2) provides evidence on whether particular 
hypothesized mechanisms linking concentration and fragility – competition, diversification, and 
the ease of monitoring – account for the identified relationship between concentration and 
stability.  We focus on these three mechanisms because of their prominence in policy and 
academic discussions. 
To investigate systemic crises, we use annual data on 69 countries over the period 1980-
1997.  While no single, unambiguous definition of a systemic crisis exists, we use the DD (2002) 
                                                                                                                                                             
risk-taking incentives of the larger banks more than smaller banks. For an analysis of the corporate governance of 
banks, see Macey and O’Hara (2003).  Note, however that even in the absence of deposit insurance, banks are prone 
to excessive risk-taking due to limited liability for their equity holders and to their high leverage (Stiglitz, 1972). 
4 For the United States, Keeley (1990) provides evidence that increased competition following the relaxation of state 
branching restrictions in the 1980s increased the risk of large banks.  However, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find 
that deregulation in the 1980s lowered loan losses, and Dick (2003) finds higher loan loss provisions following 
deregulation in the 1990s. 
  3classification and confirm the results with other definitions.  DD (2002) consider a country to be 
in a systemic crisis if (i) authorities use emergency measures, such as bank holidays, deposit 
freezes, blanket guarantees, etc., to assist the banking industry, (ii) countries undertake large 
scale nationalizations of banks, (iii) non-performing loans top ten percent of total banking assets, 
or (iv) the fiscal costs of rescue operations exceed two percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Using logit regressions, we analyze the association between banking system 
concentration and the probability that a country experiences a systemic crisis.  In the analyses we 
condition on many country characteristics, including bank supervisory and regulatory practices, 
institutional development, and macroeconomic controls, such as the level of economic 
development, economic growth, inflation, interest rates, terms of trade changes, and credit 
growth. 
The results are inconsistent with the concentration-fragility view.  We do not find a 
positive relationship between banking system concentration and the likelihood that the country 
suffers a systemic crisis.  Using different conditioning information sets, different sample periods, 
different definitions of crises, and different measures of concentration, we never find a 
significant, positive link between concentration and crises.  Thus, our analyses lend no support to 
the view that concentration increases the fragility of banks. 
Rather, the findings are broadly consistent with the concentration-stability view.  
Concentration enters the crises regressions negatively and significantly across a wide array of 
specifications.  Thus, although we emphasize numerous qualifications below, the data 
consistently indicate a positive relationship between national bank concentration and banking 
system stability. 
  4Furthermore, we provide exploratory evidence on the potential mechanisms – 
competition, diversification, and ease of monitoring -- underlying the positive relationship 
between concentration and stability.  First, to assess whether concentration proxies for 
competition, we include bank regulatory indicators and measures of national institutional 
development.  More specifically, we control for national policies toward bank entry, bank 
activities, bank ownership as well as several indicators of national institutions that affect 
competition.  If (i) these variables measure the competitive environment in banking and (ii) 
concentration proxies for competition, then including these variables should eliminate the 
significance of concentration in the fragility regressions. Moreover, these assessments provide 
independently valuable information on the linkages between banking system fragility and bank 
regulations.  Second, to assess whether concentration proxies for diversification or ease of 
monitoring, we include numerous indicators that attempt to proxy for these mechanisms.  For 
diversification, we control for (a) the size of the economy, which may correlate positively with 
the ability of banks to diversify domestically, (b) restrictions on making loans abroad, which may 
correlate negatively with the ability of banks to diversify internationally, and (c) mean bank size, 
which some argue is positively correlated with diversification.  For ease of monitoring, we 
control for (a) the number of banks, (b) regulatory restrictions on banks ability to engage in non-
lending services since the complexity of banks may hinder monitoring, (c) mean bank size since 
larger banks may be more complex than smaller banks, (d) capital regulatory requirements, 
deposit insurance, and other prudential regulations, and (e) the average cash flow rights of the 
controlling owner, if any, of the largest, listed banks in the country, which may reflect the 
incentives of the largest owner to govern the bank effectively.   Again, if including these 
variables eliminates the relationship between concentration and fragility, then this provides 
  5circumstantial evidence that concentration acts as a proxy for diversification or the cost of 
monitoring banks. 
In terms of regulatory policies and institutional development, we find that (1) fewer 
regulatory restrictions on banks – lower barriers to bank entry, fewer restrictions on bank 
activities, and fewer impediments to bank operations in general – reduce banking system fragility 
and (2) countries with national institutions that foster competition have lower banking system 
fragility.  Thus, policies and institutions that facilitate competition in banking are associated with 
less – not more -- banking system fragility.  Furthermore, capital requirements, reserve 
requirements, and prudential regulations do not affect the results on concentration and, 
interestingly, do not reduce the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis.  Regarding specific 
mechanisms associated with the concentration-stability view, the findings that (i) banking system 
concentration is associated with lower fragility and (ii) policies that foster competition are 
associated with lower fragility suggest that concentration is proxying for something else besides 
a lack of competition. 
In terms of diversification, we find some support for the view that one of the mechanisms 
underlying the negative relationship between concentration and banking system fragility is that 
concentrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks.  While recognizing 
that the measures of diversification are both indirect and potentially imprecise, we find that 
controlling for proxies of diversification substantially reduces the ties between concentration and 
crises.  More specifically, we find that (i) controlling for the size of the domestic economy 
eliminates the connection between concentration and systemic crises, (ii) controlling for the 
mean size of banks weakens the link between concentration and crises, and (iii) controlling for 
mean bank size and restrictions on foreign loans eliminates the negative relationship between 
  6banking system concentration and the probability of suffering a systemic crisis.  The results are 
consistent with arguments that countries with, on average, larger banks tend to have a lower 
likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis and inconsistent with the view that large banks distort 
public policies in a manner that increases banking system fragility. 
In contrast, we find no support for any of the views suggesting that concentration is a 
proxy for the degree of difficulty in monitoring banks.  When controlling for the number of 
banks, or regulatory restrictions on banks, or capital requirements, or prudential regulations, or 
the cash flow rights of the bank’s controlling owner (if any), this does not change the finding of a 
negative relationship between concentration and crises.  In sum, we did not find much support 
that a distinguishing characteristic of concentrated banking systems is that they are easier to 
monitor than more diffuse systems. 
The analyses in this paper are subject to considerable qualifications and interpretational 
limitations.   
First, as our own results emphasize, concentration is not necessarily a reliable indicator of 
competition (Tirole, 1988; Sutton, 1991, 1998).  Mergers and acquisitions that increase 
concentration could reflect competition, not the absence of competition.  A country with a few 
banks in a contestable market may be more competitive than a country with lots of banks in 
segmented monopolies.  This does not invalidate this paper’s usefulness.  Around the world, 
policymakers, in forming bank regulations, and courts, in assessing anti-trust challenges to bank 
consolidation, use banking system concentration as a signal.  Toward this end, our work suggests 
that (i) banking system concentration is not associated with greater bank instability; rather, it is 
associated with less fragility and (ii) policies and regulations that ease competition lower 
banking system fragility. 
  7Second, although we use different measures of banking system crises, any examination of 
systemic crises is constrained by the difficulty in defining and dating a “systemic” crisis.  Thus, 
we interpret these results cautiously and trust that this information is one useful input into 
assessing the linkages between the market structure of the banking industry, bank regulations, 
and banking system fragility.  Future research that examines the interactions among 
concentration, bank regulations, and bank fragility at the microeconomic level will provide a 
very valuable addition to the crises analyses that we provide. 
Third, the absence of time-series data on bank regulations lowers confidence in the 
finding that regulatory impediments to bank competition increase fragility.  The regulatory 
indicators are measured toward the end of the sample period, so that these indicators are 
sometimes measured after the crisis.  This data limitation is difficult to correct because it is only 
very recently that detailed data have been collected on bank regulations around the world (Barth, 
et al. (2001a,b, 2004, 2005).  More importantly for the purposes of this paper, this timing issue 
does not affect the core finding supporting the concentration-stability view as these results hold 
when including or excluding the regulatory indicators.  Furthermore, sensitivity checks suggest 
that regulatory impediments to competition did not grow after systemic crises, so that reverse 
causality does not seem to drive the results.   
Finally, our exploratory evidence that (i) supports the view that concentrated banking 
systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks and (ii) contradicts the view that 
concentrated banking systems with a few large banks are easier to monitor is just that, 
exploratory.  The measures that we use are highly imperfect measures of diversification and the 
ease of monitoring.  Nevertheless, when including imperfect indicators of diversification, this 
reduces the significance of concentration in the fragility regressions, suggesting that 
  8concentration may proxy for banking systems with larger better-diversified banks.  Given the 
natural skepticism about our proxies, however, considerably more evidence is required before 
one can draw confident conclusions about the mechanisms underlying the negative relationship 
between concentration and fragility. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II analyzes the relationship 
between banking system concentration and systemic crises.  Section III provides additional 
information on the mechanisms explaining the positive relationship between concentration and 
banking system stability. Section IV briefly lists conclusions. 
 
  9II. Does Bank Concentration Enhance the Risk of Systemic Failure? 
In this section, we examine the impact of national bank concentration on the likelihood of 
a country suffering a systemic banking crisis.  Using data on 69 countries over the period 1980-
1997, we assess the connection between banking system concentration and the incidence of 
systemic banking failures.
5  To assess the robustness of our analyses, we (i) use a range of 
different measures of bank concentration and crises, (ii) control for an array of country 
characteristics, (iii) use different estimation procedures and samples of countries, and (iv) allow 
for potential nonlinearities in the relationship between concentration and crises.  After describing 
data and methodology in the first two subsections, we present the regression results. 
II. A. Data
II.A.1. Data: Crises and concentration 
Following Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (DD, 2002), we identify and date episodes of banking sector 
distress by using information on individual bank failures and reports by national supervisory 
agencies.  Then, these episodes of distress are classified as systemic (i) if emergency measures 
were taken to assist the banking system (such as bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket 
guarantees to depositors or other bank creditors), or (ii) if large-scale nationalizations took place, 
or (iii) if non-performing assets reached at least 10 percent of total assets at the peak of the crisis, 
or (iv) if the cost of the rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP.  In sum, our sample of 
69 countries contains 47 crisis episodes.  Table 1 lists this information.   
                                                 
5 Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. (2004) investigate the impact of bank concentration on bank net interest margins, but they 
do not examine bank fragility. 
  10Crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if the country is going through a systemic 
crisis, and zero if it is not.  We experiment with different ways of dating and defining crises.
6  
First, since crises run for multiple years and since crises may influence concentration and other 
explanatory variables, implying reverse causality, most of the regressions reported in the tables 
exclude observations classified as crises after the initial year of the crisis.  That is, we only 
include the initial year of a multi-year crisis.  We do include the years after a multi-year crisis is 
over, which are non-crisis observations.
7  If the country suffers a second crisis, this is included as 
well.  Second, we also conducted the analyses when including crisis observations following the 
initial year of a multi-year banking crisis.  The results are robust to including these years and 
classifying them as either crisis observations or non-crisis observations.  Thus, the results are not 
sensitive to the classification of the crisis years following the initial year of multi-year crisis.  
Again, once each crisis is over, we include the non-crisis years that follow a multi-year crisis in 
all of the specifications.  Third, this paper’s findings are robust to changing the definition of a 
crisis to also include borderline crises as defined by Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).  Specifically, 
borderline cases do not meet the definition of a systemic crisis described above and instead 
include cases where a large bank fails.  We do not believe it is appropriate to include borderline 
cases because we are assessing the impact of banking system concentration on systemic banking 
crises, not the failure of a large bank.  In sum, while recognizing that there is no single, 
unanimous definition of a systemic banking crisis, the primary goal of this section is to provide a 
cross-country, time-series assessment of the relationship between national bank concentration 
                                                 
6 Clearly, there may be disagreements about the dating of major crises.  For example, the database we are using 
classifies the United States as having a crisis from 1980-1992 and many may dispute this dating.  Nevertheless, we 
use different dating conventions and we use different sub-samples to reduce fears that dating problems drive the 
results. 
7 The results also hold when dropping all post-crisis years for each country experiencing a crisis. 
  11and crises.  The identified relationship is robust to using these different definitions of a systemic 
crisis. 
Concentration equals the share of total banking system assets held by the three largest 
banks.  The data are from the Bankscope database.  Since the sample of banks covered in 
Bankscope increased over the sample period, changes in the concentration measure could reflect 
changes in coverage. To reduce biases stemming from the coverage problem, we average the 
concentration measure over the period 1988-1997.  As reported in Tables 1 and 2, most countries 
have concentrated banking systems with a sample mean of 72 percent.  Still, there is wide cross-
country variation in the sample, with concentration levels ranging from less than 20 percent for 
the U.S. to 100 percent for many African countries.  Simple correlations show a significant 
negative relationship between the crisis dummy and bank concentration. 
In robustness tests, we consider a number of different concentration measures.  This 
paper’s results hold when using (i) annual concentration values, (ii) concentration from 
Bankscope measured at the beginning of the sample period (1988), and (iii) a measure of 
concentration based on the Barth et al (2004) survey of bank supervisory agencies regarding 
deposits in banks.
8  Moreover, by confirming our results using the initial level of concentration at 
the start of the sample period, we reduce reverse causality concerns.  Unfortunately, using initial 
values cuts the number of observations in half.  Thus, we focus on the data averaged over the 
entire period. 
 
                                                 
8 This alternative measure of concentration is from the Barth et al (2004) survey database, which defines bank 
concentration as the share of deposits of the largest five banks.  The correlation between the concentration measures 
calculated from Bankscope data and from Barth et al. is 52%, and is significant at the 1%-level. 
  12II.A.2. Data: Core Control variables 
To investigate the relationship between systemic banking crises and banking system 
concentration, we condition on an assortment of macroeconomic and regulatory factors that may 
also influence banking system fragility.    
We start with the explanatory variables from DD’s (2002) examination of the 
determinants of banking system crises.  DD (2002) include four contemporary explanatory 
variables to control for macroeconomic factors that may affect the quality of bank assets and 
bank profitability: (i) national economic growth (Real GDP Growth), (ii) changes in the 
external terms of trade (Terms of Trade Change), (iii) the rate of inflation (Inflation), and (iv) 
the short-term real interest rate (Real Interest Rate).  DD (2002) include two variables to 
control for international forces influencing bank vulnerability: (i) the rate of exchange rate 
depreciation (Depreciation) and (ii) the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves 
(M2/Reserves).  Since rapid credit growth may signal an asset price bubble, DD (2002) include 
lagged credit growth (Credit Growtht-2).  To condition on the overall level of economic 
development, DD (2002) also include the level of real per capita GDP (GDP per capita).  In 
robustness tests, we also include DD’s (2002) measure of deposit insurance generosity (Moral 
Hazard). To build an aggregate index of moral hazard, DD (2003) estimate the first principal 
component of various deposit insurance design features.  Specifically, they use coinsurance, 
coverage of foreign currency and inter-bank deposits, type of funding, source of funding, 
management, membership, and the level of explicit coverage to create this aggregate index that 
increases with the generosity of the deposit insurance regime. The index varies over time since 
different countries adopted deposit insurance or revised its design features at different points in 
time. 
  13Simple correlations in Table 2 suggest that banking crises are more likely in countries 
with less concentrated banking systems, higher levels of inflation and exchange rate depreciation 
and less likely in growing countries with higher GDP per capita and higher real interest rates.  
Crises are more likely in countries with more generous deposit insurance.  
  
II.A.3. Data: Bank Regulation and Supervision Control variables 
We augment the benchmark specification from DD (2002) by including measures of bank 
regulation and supervision from Barth et al., (2001a,b, 2004).  These data on bank supervision 
and regulation around the world were collected through surveys of government officials from 
over 100 countries in 1999.  This is a problem because the crises regressions are run over the 
period 1980-1997.  Thus, the regulatory indicators are measured after the dependent variable.  
Besides the fact that no other dataset has the level of cross-country detail on bank regulations, we 
offer three additional defenses for using these data in the crisis regressions despite the time 
problem.  First, Barth et al., (2001a) show that the regulatory restrictions on bank activities did 
not change much following systemic crises.  Moreover, in the few cases when they did change, 
there was a change toward fewer regulatory restrictions.  Thus, the timing of the Barth et al. 
(2001a) data actually biases the results against finding a positive relationship between regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities and the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis.  Second, Carkovic 
and Levine (2002) show that the bank regulations that compose the Barth et al. (2001a) survey 
have remained virtually unchanged in Chile during the decade of the 1990s. Third, Barth, et al.’s 
(2005) follow-up survey indicates that there have been remarkably few substantive changes in 
bank regulatory regimes since the initial survey in 1999, which advertises the stability of bank 
supervisory and regulatory policies.  Nevertheless, timing issues are an important constraint on 
  14our ability to draw confident conclusions on the market power, diversification, and easier 
monitoring explanations of why concentration is associated with more stable banking systems.  
We include bank regulation indicators to accomplish three objectives.  First, controlling 
for differences in national policies provides a simple robustness test of the relationship between 
concentration and crises.  Second, controlling for regulations provides additional information on 
the concentration-fragility relationship.  If concentration is proxying for regulations that impede 
competition, then controlling for the regulatory environment will drive out the significance of 
concentration in the crisis regression.  Finally, examining the relationship between bank 
regulations and banking system stability is independently valuable since countries may 
implement regulations to promote banking system stability.  The timing problem primarily, 
though not necessarily exclusively, affects this last motivation for including the regulatory 
controls: The fact that regulations are measured after crises reduces the confidence we have in 
the results on regulations. 
Fraction of Entry Denied equals the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of 
the number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities, which is a measure of 
entry restrictions in banking and thus the contestability of the market.  If entry restrictions only 
increase bank profits, this would be associated with a lower rate of fragility.  If however, entry 
restrictions induce inefficiencies in the banking market, then they could lead to greater fragility.   
Activity Restrictions is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities.  This 
includes information on regulation regarding bank activities in the securities, insurance, real 
estate markets, and banks owning nonfinancial firms.  For each of these four categories of bank 
activities, each country is given a score of one through four depending on the degree to which 
regulations restrict bank activity in each area: (1) unrestricted, (2) permitted, (3) restricted, or (4) 
  15prohibited.  The aggregate indicator has therefore a range from four to 16, with higher numbers 
indicating more restrictions on bank activities. If these activity restrictions keep banks from 
entering risky lines of business, then Activity Restrictions will tend to reduce the probability of 
crises. If, however, regulatory restrictions on bank activities prevent firms from diversifying 
risks, then higher values of Activity Restrictions will tend to increase the probability of suffering 
a systemic crisis.   
Required Reserves equals the ratio of bank assets that regulators require banks to hold 
as reserves.  Banking systems with higher ratios of required reserves may be more stable since 
they would have a greater buffer to absorb liquidity shocks.  However, greater required reserves 
are also a tax on the banking system, which may lower profits and raise fragility. 
Capital Regulatory Index is a summary measure of each country’s capital stringency 
requirements and taken from Barth et al (2004). To the extent that book capital is an accurate 
measure of bank solvency we expect better capitalized banks to be less fragile.  Also, capital 
regulations are a focus of Basel agreements to reduce systemic risk.  Thus, including an index of 
national capital regulations will provide information on whether cross-country differences in one 
of the three “pillars” of the Basel II Accord on prudential bank supervision and regulation 
actually explain differences in banking system fragility.  Problematically, however, Barth et al 
(2005) stress that Basel’s success and the lack of historical data on capital regulations make it 
difficult to assess the impact of capital regulations.  Specifically, because Basel has successfully 
harmonized capital regulations over the past decade, there may be insufficient cross-country 
variation in the Capital Regulatory Index to explain systemic crises. 
Official Supervisory Power is an index of the power of the commercial bank 
supervisory agency to monitor and discipline banks (Barth, et al., 2004).  It includes information 
  16on the legal power of the supervisory authority to (i) meet with, demand information from, and 
impose penalties on auditors, (ii) force a bank to change its internal organizational structure, 
managers, directors, etc. (iii) oblige the bank to provision against potential bad loans, suspend 
dividends, bonuses, management fees, and to supersede the rights of shareholders, and (iv) 
intervene a bank and/or declare a bank insolvent.  The Appendix provides a more detailed 
definition of Official Supervisory Power.  An emphasis of the Basel II accord on prudential 
supervision and regulation is to strengthen official monitoring of banks.  We use this indicator of 
the power of the supervisory authority to assess the robustness of the results on concentration 
and to examine the relationship between Official Supervisory Power and the probability that a 
country suffers a systemic crisis. 
 
II.A.4. Data: Bank Ownership Control variables  
Next, we also control for ownership.   
State ownership equals the percentage of banking system assets controlled by banks that 
are 50 percent or more government owned, which is taken from the Barth et al (2001) database.
9  
If government owned banks enjoy greater government support than private banks, then banking 
systems with a larger share of public banks may experience fewer banks runs and fewer (overt) 
banking crises.  However, inefficiencies in public banks may also make them more fragile as 
argued by Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000).    While providing evidence on the relationship 
between ownership and crises, we use State Ownership as a control variable to test the 
                                                 
9 As a robustness check, we employ a different measure of state-ownership from La Porta et al. (2002), which equals 
the percentage of government ownership (voting rights) of the assets of the ten largest banks in each country where 
ownership of each bank is weighted by the assets of that bank.  Thus, the La Porta et al. (2002) measure does not 
define bank ownership in terms of voting rights greater than 50 percent.  We get the same results with both 
measures.   
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between State Ownership and crises. 
Foreign Ownership equals the percentage of the banking system’s assets in banks that 
are 50 percent or more foreign owned, which is also taken from the Barth et al., (2001) database.  
Foreign banks may bring better banking practices that improve the operation and safety of the 
banking system (Claessens, et al., 2001).  On the other hand, greater openness to foreign banks 
could intensify competition, reduce profits, and hurt stability.  Thus, it is an empirical question as 
to whether, on net, foreign bank ownership stabilizes or destabilizes a banking system.  Again, 
our goal is to assess the robustness of the relationship between concentration and crises, not to 
explore fully the impact of foreign banks on the operation of domestic financial system.  The 
simple correlation between Foreign Ownership and crises is insignificant. 
 
II.A.5. Data: Openness, Competition, Institutional Control Variables  
Finally, we include additional control variables for the general openness, 
competitiveness, and institutional development of the banking sector in particular and the 
economy more generally.  There is overlap between some of these general indexes and the 
individual regulatory and ownership variables defined above.  Also, there is overlap among these 
general indicators.  Thus, we note these overlaps in defining the variables and do not include 
them simultaneously in the regressions below.  
Banking Freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking system.  We 
obtain these data from the Heritage Foundation and use an average over the period 1995-97.  It is 
a composite index of the barriers foreign banks and financial services firms face in conducting 
banking operations, how difficult it is to open domestic banks and other financial services firms, 
  18how heavily regulated the financial system is, the presence of state-owned banks, whether the 
government influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are restricted from providing 
insurance and securities market services to clients.  Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on 
banking freedoms.  This aggregate Banking Freedom indicator also uses information from the 
regulatory restrictions, entry restrictions, and ownership indicators discussed above.  We include 
this for two reasons.  First, debate exists on the impact of official restrictions on bank operations.  
On the one hand, fewer official impediments to bank operations and entry could stimulate 
efficiency and diversification that promotes stability.  On the other hand, greater banking 
freedom could induce destabilizing competition.  We provide information on this debate.  
Second, official impediments to bank freedom could influence both concentration and fragility.  
Since our goal is to assess the independent link between concentration and crises, we test the 
robustness of the findings to controlling for banking freedom. 
Economic Freedom is an indicator of how a country’s policies rank in terms of 
providing economic freedoms.  It is a composite of ten indicators ranking policies in the areas of 
trade, government finances, government interventions, monetary policy, capital flows and 
foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black 
market activity.  We obtain these data from the Heritage Foundation and use an average over the 
period 1995-97.  Higher scores indicate polices more conducive to competition and economic 
freedom.    Also, Banking Freedom is a subcomponent of Economic Freedom, which includes 
information on economic freedom beyond the banking industry.  To the extent freedoms allow 
banks to improve efficiency and to engage in different activities and diversify their risks, we 
expect increased level of freedoms to reduce fragility.  However, it is also true that greater 
freedoms allow banks to undertake greater risks, particularly if the underlying institutional 
  19environment and existing regulations and supervision distort risk-taking incentives.  Thus, 
overall greater freedom may also lead to greater bank fragility.  Thus, we (a) examine the 
relationship between economic freedom and crises and (b) assess the strength of the relationship 
between concentration and crises conditional on overall economic freedom.  
KKZ_Composite is an index of the overall level of institutional development 
constructed by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  The underlying indicators are voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption.  This index is available for 1998.  We expect better institutions to lead 
to reduced bank fragility, controlling for all other factors.   Simple correlations indicate that the 
crisis dummy is negatively and significantly correlated with the two freedom indicators and the 
institutions variable.  Countries with better institutions also tend to have more competitive 
banking systems with fewer regulatory restrictions.  Thus, it is independently valuable to 
examine the relationship between institutional development and banking system stability.  At the 
same time, we use KKZ_Composite to gauge the strength of the independent relationship 
between concentration and crises.   
 
II.B. Methodology
  Methodologically, to estimate the crisis model, we follow Cole and Gunther (1995), 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997), Demirguc-Kunt (1989), and DD (1998, 2002) and use a logit 
probability model with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Specifically, we 
estimate the probability that a systemic crisis will occur at a particular time in a particular 
country, assuming that this probability is a function of explanatory variables (X(i,t)).  Let P(i, t) 
denote a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a banking crisis occurs in country i 
  20and time t and a value of zero otherwise. β is a vector of n unknown coefficients and F(βΝX(i, t)) 
is the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at βΝX(i, t).  Then, the log-
likelihood function of the model is: 
 
Ln L =  ∑t=1...T ∑i=1...n{P(i,t)ln[F(βΝX(i,t))] + (1-P(i,t)) ln[1- F(βΝX(i,t))]}. 
 
We also conducted robustness tests using alternative estimation procedures.  First, this 
core specification allows for heteroskedasticity but assumes that the errors are independent.  We 
confirm the results, however, when allowing for clustering of the errors within countries, which 
requires that the error terms are independent across countries but not within countries.  Second, 
the results hold when estimating a logit model with random country effects. 
 
II.C. Results
The paper finds that crises are less likely in more concentrated banking systems using 
different measures of concentration and conditioning on different country characteristics.  As 
shown in Table 3, Concentration always enters with a negative and significant coefficient.  
Regression 1 presents our baseline specification, where we exclude observations classified as 
crises after the first year of a multi-year banking crisis.  Regressions 2 and 3 include crisis 
observations after the initial crisis year.  In column 2, crisis observations following the initial 
year of a multi-year crisis are classified as crises.
10  In column 3, crisis observations after the 
                                                 
10 This explains the entry of 202 crises in column 2 of Table 3.  When we include all of the years of each multi-year 
banking crisis, this adds an additional 155 crisis observations to the number reported in regressions 1 and 3. 
  21initial year of a multi-year crisis are classified as non-crisis observations.
11  In all three 
regressions, Concentration enters negatively and significantly.   
The negative relationship between concentration and crises is robust to alternative 
specifications and to controlling for reverse causality.  If systemic crises reduce concentration, 
then it would be inappropriate to interpret our early results as implying that concentration 
reduces banking system fragility.  Thus, in regression 4, we use the value of banking system 
concentration measured at the beginning of the sample period instead of concentration averaged 
over the period. Even when using initial concentration, however, we continue to find a negative 
relationship between concentration and crises. Regression 5 shows that the results do not depend 
on including or excluding Real GDP per capita.  Regression 6 assesses whether the results 
change if the country is a G10 country.  We see that country membership in the G10 does not 
alter the results on concentration.  Further, the insignificant interaction between concentration 
and membership in G10 indicates that the relationship between concentration and systemic 
banking fragility does not vary between the G10 countries and the remainder of the sample. 
Among the control variables in Table 3, annual Real GDP growth enters negatively and 
significantly throughout.  This suggests that macroeconomic success reduces the likelihood of 
suffering a crisis.  Or, to phrase this differently, recessions increase banking system fragility.  
The estimates also indicate that Real interest rate enters positively, which confirms earlier 
research (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).   
Furthermore, the economic impact of banking system concentration on the likelihood of a 
country suffering a systemic crisis is large.  We evaluate the marginal impact of concentration on 
the probability of crisis at the mean values for all variables using regression 1 from Table 3.  The 
                                                 
11 In all three specifications, we include observations after the crisis is over.  Thus, we include the switch from crisis 
to the non-crisis state. 
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crisis probability of one percent.  Since crisis probabilities at any point in time are quite low, 
with a mean value of four percent, this is a substantial reduction.  We have recalculated the 
economic impact of a marginal increase in bank concentration when using a sample that includes 
the year after the initial year of the crisis.  Using this larger sample, we find an even larger 
economic impact of concentration on crises than in the core regression presented in Table 3. 
This paper’s findings hold when allowing for a potential nonlinear relationship between 
concentration and crises.  First, we added a simple quadratic term and found no evidence of a 
nonlinear relationship. Next, we estimated piece-wise regressions, where concentration was 
broken into (a) quintiles and then (b) deciles.  The results indicate that the stabilizing effect of 
concentration becomes significant after the first quintile (second decile), where the quintile and 
decile analyses identify consistent cut-offs.  The data indicate that there is a statistically 
significant, negative relationship between concentration and banking system fragility for levels 
of concentration above 35 percent and the marginal impact of a change in concentration does not 
vary significantly beyond this 35 percent cut-off.  This cut-off is low, considering that the sample 
mean value of national banking system concentration is 72 percent.  There is never a positive 
relationship between concentration and fragility.  Third, we examine whether concentration has 
different effects in different institutional settings by interacting concentration and our measures 
of institutional development (Economic Freedom and KKZ_composite).  Again, this did not 
change the result of a negative relationship between bank concentration and the probability of 
suffering a systemic crisis. 
The negative relationship between crises and concentration also holds when using 
different samples of countries.  Specifically, we excluded all countries with populations less than 
  231 million, less than 10 million, and less than 20 million, respectively.  The coefficient on 
concentration remains negative and significant across these three different samples of countries.  
Next, we excluded all Sub-Saharan African countries since they tend to have very high bank 
concentration ratios and we eliminated the G-10 countries because their high level of 
institutional development may not be captured appropriately with the control variables.  Again, 
these two different samples yield the same results.  Finally, we excluded a few country-year data 
points where the data seem to be mis-measured because the values are extraordinarily different 
from the country’s average value over the sample.
12  The results do not change. 
In sum, these results are consistent with the concentration-stability theory’s argument that 
banking systems characterized by a few, large banks are more stable than less concentrated 
banking markets.  There is certainly no evidence that banking system concentration increases 
banking sector fragility.  Furthermore, the inverse relationship between banking system 
concentration and the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis holds when allowing for possible 
nonlinear links between concentration and fragility and when using different samples of 
countries.
  Next, we assess the robustness of these results to conditioning on additional country 
specific traits. 
 
II.D. Additional Sensitivity Tests and Discussion 
II.D.1. Additional Country Level Controls 
In Table 4, we confirm the findings on the relationship between banking sector 
concentration and systemic crises when controlling for (i) moral hazard associated with deposit 
insurance, (ii) different bank regulations, (iii) the ownership of banks, and (iv) general indicators 
                                                 
12 Specifically, we eliminate Ivory Coast (1993) because their M2/reserves values are very different for that year.  
Similarly, in these outlier tests, we exclude Peru (1991) because its inflation and real interest rate values are so 
different from other years. 
  24of banking freedom, economic freedom, and institutional development.  The results hold when 
controlling for Moral Hazard, Fraction of Entry Applications Denied, Activity Restrictions, 
Official Supervisory Power, Required Reserves, and the Capital Regulatory Index (regressions 1 
– 6).  The significance level on Concentration falls to ten percent level when including Fraction 
of Entry Applications Denied, but data limitations on Fraction of Entry Applications Denied cuts 
the sample from 989 to 583 observations.  Furthermore, Concentration remains negatively 
associated with crises at the one percent significance level when controlling for state or foreign 
ownership of banks (regressions 7 and 8).  In terms of broad measures such as Banking freedom 
or general indictors of Economic freedom and institutional development (KKZ_composite), 
Concentration continues to enter the crisis regress negatively and significantly at the one percent 
level (regression 9-11).  The regressions in Table 4 do not include GDP per capita because (i) the 
regulatory/institutional variables are highly correlated with the level of development and (ii) 
GDP per capita is often used to proxy for institutional development.  However, including GDP 
per capita in Table 4 does not change the conclusions on concentration. 
Beyond Concentration, the Table 4 results indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more 
severe regulatory restrictions on bank activities boost bank fragility.  These are consistent with 
the results obtained by Barth et al. (2004), who examine the impact of entry restrictions and 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities on crises in a purely cross-country investigation that 
does not control for bank concentration.  A higher fraction of entry applications denied – a proxy 
for tighter entry regulations – leads to higher levels of fragility in the banking system.  This is 
consistent with the argument that restricted entry reduces the efficiency of the banking system, 
also making it more vulnerable to external shocks.  Similarly, we find that restrictions on bank 
activities increase crisis probabilities.  This result indicates that overall these restrictions prevent 
  25banks from diversifying outside their traditional business, reducing their ability to reduce the 
riskiness of their portfolios.    
Overall, the results do not provide support for Basel II’s emphasis on capital regulations 
and more stringent regulations.  We do not find that stricter capital regulations or greater official 
supervisory power lowers the probability that a country will suffer a systemic crisis.  While it is 
natural and appropriate to question these results because of the timing issues emphasized above, 
we are unaware of cross-country research that finds that banking system stability is enhanced by 
countries adopting official supervisory and regulatory regimes that impose stricter capital 
regulations or more stringent prudential regulations.  Indeed, a growing body of evidence 
suggests that strengthening official supervisory power can actually increase corruption in lending 
and reduce banking system efficiency (Barth et al., 2005; Beck, et al., 2004; Demirguc-Kunt, 
Laeven, and Levine, 2004).  Finally, confirming earlier research, we also see that state ownership 
is associated with greater fragility, albeit significant only at ten percent (Caprio and Martinez-
Peria, 2000). 
  26Furthermore, the results in Table 4 suggest that openness, competition, and institutional 
development foster greater banking system stability.  Countries with greater freedoms in banking 
(Banking Freedom) and generally more competitive economic systems (Economic Freedom) are 
less likely to experience banking crises (regressions 9 and 10). This finding suggests that 
concentration is not simply proxying for the degree of competition in the banking industry.  
Better institutional environment is also associated with a lower probability of systemic crisis 
(regression 11).  The evidence is consistent with theories that emphasize the stabilizing effects of 




II.D.2. Costs of Banking Crises 
We also assessed whether countries with concentrated banking systems have bigger, 
more costly banking crises.  If (i) concentrated banking systems are more likely to have too-big-
to-fail policies and (ii) too-big-to-fail policies induce greater risk-taking and (iii) too-big-too fail 
policies can operate for only some fixed period of time, then this suggests that crises will be 
larger, though less frequent, in concentrated banking systems.  If this were the case, then our 
findings that (a) concentration is associated with a lower probability of suffering a systemic crisis 
and (b) concentration is associated with greater bank-level stability may provide a misleading 
impression of the concentration-stability relationship.   
Thus, in Table 5, we examine the relationship between banking system concentration and 
the costs of banking crises.  To include countries that suffered no crises in the sample, we use a 
                                                 
13 Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) stress that competition exerts a stabilizing impact on banks because more competitive 
banks charge lower interest rates to firms and these lower rates reduce the likelihood of default.  This prediction is 
consistent with our results.  However, Boyd and De Nicolo (2004) use bank concentration as an indicator of bank 
competition.  Thus, they stress that concentration will exert a destabilizing impact on banks, which is inconsistent 
with our results.   
  27Tobit model, where zero implies that the country did not experience a banking crisis. We use 
three different measures of banking crisis costs.  The first two measures are from Klingebiel and 
Honohan (2003).  The last is the Boyd and Smith (2005) measure of the cost of the banking 
crises.   
As shown in Table 5, we find no evidence for the contention that more concentrated 
banking systems have more costly crises. Concentration does not enter significantly at the five 
percent level in any of the regression.  It enters with a negative coefficient across the different 
cost measures.  Given the lack of a robust relationship, however, we do not draw the conclusion 
that concentration reduces both the likelihood and the size of crises. 
 
III. Why is Concentration Stabilizing? Additional Evidence from Crisis Data 
Although the finding of a negative relationship between banking system concentration 
and the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis is consistent with the concentration-stability 
view (Tables 3 and 4), the results do not distinguish among possible explanations of this finding.  
Why is concentration stabilizing?  This section explores the validity of different explanations for 
why bank concentration lowers banking system fragility. 
 
A.  Is it market power and bank profits? 
One possible argument is that the level of bank concentration proxies for the degree of 
competition in the banking industry.  According to this market power view, powerful banks 
(either directly or through policymakers) restrict competition, which boosts bank profits, lowers 
incentives for risk taking, and thus reduces systemic risk.  Thus, the finding of a negative 
relationship between banking system concentration and systemic crises is consistent with the 
  28view that banking sector concentration increases banking system stability by reducing the 
openness and competitive of the banking industry. 
In contrast to this market power explanation of how concentration promotes banking 
system stability, however, note that concentration remains negatively associated with crises even 
when controlling for regulatory restrictions on bank activities and measures of the openness and 
competitiveness of the banking industry and the economy more generally.  Thus, to the extent 
that these variables adequately control for competition, the findings suggest that something else 
besides market power is driving the negative relationship between bank concentration and bank 
fragility.   
The findings on bank regulations, banking freedom, economic freedom, and institutional 
development also run counter to the view that competition intensifies fragility.  Restrictions on 
competition and openness -- such as regulatory impediments to the entry of new banks, or 
regulatory barriers to banks engaging in non-lending services, or general indicators of the 
openness of the banking industry or the overall economy – do not reduce the probability of 
suffering a systemic banking crisis (Table 4).  Thus, the findings that (i) concentration lowers 
banking system fragility and (ii) low competition raises banking system fragility imply that 
concentration is not proxying for the degree of competition in the banking industry. 
However, the measures of bank regulation, bank freedom, economic freedom, and 
institutional development may not sufficiently control for competition in banking.  Thus, given 
the difficulty in adequately controlling for the competitive environment using regulatory 
indicators, some may view the Table 4 results as too weak to discard the market power 
explanation of why concentration is stabilizing.   
 
  29B.  Is it diversification? 
Next, consider the argument that banks in more concentrated banking systems are more 
diversified than banking systems composed of many small banks.  If this argument is correct and 
if we include good measures of bank diversification in the systemic crises regressions, then this 
should drive out the significance of bank concentration.   
To proxy for the diversification channel, we use three measures.  First, we use Mean 
bank size, which equals total bank assets divided by the number of banks.
 14  The presumption is 
that larger banks tend to be more diversified.  While clearly problematic, bank-level data on each 
bank’s asset holdings are impossible to obtain.  So, we use Mean bank size in trying to assess 
why concentration is associated with lower levels of banking system fragility.  If mean bank size 
does not drive out the significance of concentration, this weakens the argument that concentrated 
banking systems have larger, better diversified banks than less concentrated banking systems 
with smaller banks.  However, since bank size does not directly measure diversification, finding 
that mean bank size drives out concentration provides only suggestive support for the 
diversification argument.   
Second, we include an indicator of regulatory restrictions on banks’ ability to diversify 
risk abroad.  Specifically, No foreign loans equals one if banks are prohibited from making 
foreign loans and zero otherwise.  In many countries, it may be impossible for banks to 
sufficiently diversify their asset holding domestically.  Thus, restrictions on investing abroad 
may doom domestic banks to holding excessively risky assets.  Indeed, countries with both small 
banks and regulatory restrictions on those banks lending abroad may have especially unstable 
banks.  Again, if we control for these measures of diversification and they drive out the 
significance of concentration in the systemic crisis regressions, then this provides “smoking gun” 
                                                 
14 Using the mean bank size of the largest three banks does not change our results. 
  30evidence that concentration is associated with banking system stability because concentration is 
associated with more diversified banks. 
A third potential indicator of bank diversification is the size of the economy.  The 
presumption, albeit questionable, is that larger economies are more diversified and therefore 
offer banks easier means to hold diversified loan portfolios.  Thus, we include the level of GDP 
in attempting to dissect the negative relationship between concentration and crises.
15
The results in Table 6 provide suggestive support for the view that concentrated banking 
systems are composed of bigger, more diversified banks that are hence less prone to systemic 
failure.  As the results in Table 6 show, the significance of the concentration coefficient drops to 
ten percent when we control for bank size and completely disappears when we control for the 
size of the economy (regressions 1 and 2).  These findings are consistent with the view that part 
of the reason that concentration enhances stability is that concentrated systems are composed of 
bigger, better-diversified banks.  Regression 3 indicates that including the No Foreign Loans 
does not alter the findings on banking system concentration.  In regression 4, the concentration 
effect becomes completely insignificant when including the (i) mean bank size, (ii) no foreign 
loans, and (iii) the interaction term between bank size and no foreign loans.  This result in 
column 4 indicates that countries with larger banks become significantly more prone to systemic 
crises if they prohibit their banks from investing abroad.  This finding on the interaction between 
bank size and regulatory restrictions on foreign loans runs counter to our prediction that 
restrictions on foreign lending would be particularly destabilizing for small (presumably less 
diversified) banks.  Nevertheless, while these measures of diversification are highly imperfect, 
including these proxies for diversification drives out the significance of banking system 
concentration and suggests that the diversification explanation has some merit.    
                                                 
15 Replacing GDP by M2 to control for the size of the financial system does not change our results. 
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C.  Is it easier monitoring? 
A third argument for why concentration is stabilizing is that (i) concentrated banking 
systems tend to have a few large banks and (ii) a few large banks are easier to monitor than many 
small ones.  As above, if this easier monitoring argument is correct and if we include good 
measures of monitoring in the crisis regressions, then this should drive out the significance of 
bank concentration.  Of course, there are countervailing views.  Large banks may be 
substantially more complex than small banks.  So, supervision may be more difficult with a few, 
complex banks than with a higher number of simple banks.
16
We use three measures to attempt to capture empirically the ease of monitoring banks.  
First, we use the No. of banks, which equals the number of banks in the economy.  The easier 
monitoring argument relies on the presumption that concentrated banking systems have a few 
large banks and this is crucial in explaining better monitoring and greater banking system 
stability.  Second, Activity Restrictions equals regulatory restrictions on the ability of banks to 
engage in securities market, insurance and real estate activities as well as restrictions on banks 
owning non-financial firms.  The presumption is that greater regulatory restrictions will make it 
easier to monitor banks.  So, to the extent that regulatory restrictions are correlated with bank 
concentration, this would help account for the negative relationship between concentration and 
systemic crises.  Third, Cash-flow is the fraction of a bank’s total cash-flow rights held by each 
bank’s main owner, averaged across each country’s banks.  As suggested by La Porta et al (1999, 
2002), countries where laws and regulations are ineffective at protecting the rights of small 
                                                 
16 As pointed out to us by Mark Carey and Rene Stulz, there is another dimension to this monitoring argument.  If 
monitoring skills are scare and there are economies of scope in monitoring, then concentrated banking systems may 
facilitate monitoring.  However, the scarcity of monitoring skills, and hence the benefits of concentration, may 
different across countries. 
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corporate control and instead have concentrated cash-flow rights to induce the main owner to 
exert sound corporate governance.  In terms of banks, Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2004) show 
that a bank’s major owner tends to have higher cash-flow rights in countries where the 
institutions underlying monitoring of banks are weak, such as weak shareholder protection laws 
or ineffective bank supervision and regulation.  These weak institutions discourage diffuse 
ownership and produce concentrated ownership of banks.  Thus, we use each country’s average 
cash-flow rights across banks as an additional proxy of each country’s monitoring regime.  If 
including cash-flow rights eliminates the significance of concentration, concerns would naturally 
arise about the endogeneity of cash-flow rights.  But, if including cash-flow rights does not alter 
the results on concentration, then this simply represents an additional, if flawed, robustness 
check. 
The results presented in Table 6 do not provide support for the easier monitoring view of 
why concentration reduces the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis.  Including the No. of 
banks, reduces the significance of Concentration to ten percent, but the significance level is 
restored once we also control for Activity Restrictions. Including Cash-flows does not alter the 
findings on Concentration either.  No. of banks and Activity Restrictions do not enter the crises 
regressions significantly.  Cash-flow enters positively, which is consistent with the view that in 
countries with weak legal and corporate governance institutions and ineffective bank supervision 
and regulation the ownership structure adjusts such that cash-flow becomes concentrated in order 
to boost monitoring incentives.  However, the resultant outcome is still associated with a higher 
likelihood of suffering a crisis.  For the purposes of this paper, the point is that including proxies 
for the monitoring regime does not alter the results on Concentration significantly.  This 
  33suggests, to the extent that these are reasonable proxies, that Concentration is not a simple proxy 
for easier monitoring. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
To summarize, using a cross-country, time-series panel of data on systemic banking 
crises, we find that greater bank concentration is associated with a lower likelihood of suffering a 
crisis.  We never find that concentration increases fragility.  While subject to the qualifications 
stressed in the Introduction and throughout the paper, the negative relationship between 
concentration and crises is robust to including various control variables, including indicators of 
the macroeconomic environment, the international environment, the domestic banking 
environment, bank supervisory and regulatory policies, and indexes of overall economic freedom 
and institutional development.  Furthermore, reverse causality does not seem to be driving the 
concentration-stability findings.  Thus, the data on systemic crises are more consistent with the 
concentration-stability view than with the concentration-fragility view. 
In searching for the mechanisms underlying the concentration-stability result, we find no 
support for the view that banking system concentration is a proxy for a less competitive banking 
environment.  We draw this conclusion for two reasons.  First, when we include regulatory and 
institutional measures of the degree of competition in banking and the overall economy, we find 
that crises are less – not more – likely in competitive regulatory and institutional environments.  
Second, even when we control for these regulatory and institutional measure of the degree of 
competition, we continue to find that concentration is negatively associated with systemic crises.  
To the extent that we have good measures of the competitive environment, these findings suggest 
  34that banking system concentration is a proxy for something else besides banking industry 
competition. 
Furthermore, we find suggestive support that concentrated banking systems have more 
diversified banks, but not evidence that concentrated banking systems with a few large banks are 
easier to monitor and hence more stable than less concentrated banking systems.  On monitoring, 
none of our measures of the ease of monitoring enters significantly and including them in the 
analyses did not alter the coefficient on bank concentration.  On diversification, the data indicate 
that part of the reason concentrated banking systems lower the probability of suffering a systemic 
crisis is that concentrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks with a 
correspondingly lower probability of failure.  We draw this tentative conclusion because the 
concentration-crisis link weakens appreciably when we include proxies for diversification.  We 
emphasize, however, that these proxies are aggregate indicators and do not directly measure 
individual bank asset diversification, and hence we view these results as suggestive and hope that 
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  40Table 1.  Bank Concentration and Competition and Banking Crises 
 
GDP per capita is in constant dollars, averaged over the entire sample period, 1980-97.  Crisis period denotes the years in which 
each country experienced a systemic banking crisis and the duration of said crisis.  Concentration is a measure of concentration in 
the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over 1988-97.   
Sources are in the data appendix. 
 
  GDP per capita   Crisis Period   Concentration  
Australia 17913    0.65 
Austria 25785    0.75 
Bahrain 9398    0.93 
Belgium 24442    0.64 
Benin 362  (1988-90)  1.00 
Botswana 2781    0.94 
Burundi 186    1.00 
Cameroon 790  (1987-93,  1995-98)  0.95 
Canada 18252    0.58 
Chile 3048  (1981-87)  0.49 
Colombia 1802  (1982-85)  0.49 
Congo 940   1.00 
Ivory Coast  843  (1988-91)  0.96 
Cyprus 9267    0.88 
Denmark 31049    0.78 
Dominican 
Republic 
1426   0.65 
Ecuador 1516  (1995-97)  0.40 
Egypt 905    0.67 
El Salvador  1450  (1989)  0.84 
Finland 23304  (1991-94)  0.85 
France 24227   0.44 
Germany 27883    0.48 
Ghana 356  (1982-89)  0.89 
Greece 10202   0.79 
Guatemala 1415    0.37 
Guyana 653  (1993-95)  1.00 
Honduras 694    0.44 
India 313  (1991-97)  0.47 
Indonesia 761  (1992-97) 0.44 
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  GDP per capita   Crisis Period   Concentration  
Ireland 13419   0.74 
Israel 13355  (1983-84)  0.84 
Italy 17041  (1990-95)  0.35 
Jamaica 1539  (1996-97)  0.82 
Japan 35608  (1992-97)  0.24 
Jordan 1646  (1989-90)  0.92 
Kenya 336  (1993)  0.74 
Korea 6857  (1997)  0.31 
Lesotho 356    1.00 
Malaysia 3197  (1985-88,  1997)  0.54 
Mali 260  (1987-89)  0.91 
Mauritius 2724    0.94 
Mexico 3240  (1982,  1994-97)  0.63 
Nepal 179  (1988-97)  0.90 
Netherlands 22976    0.76 
New Zealand  15539    0.77 
Nigeria 251  (1991-95)  0.83 
Norway 28843  (1987-93)  0.85 
Panama 2824  (1988-89)  0.42 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1024 (1989-97)  0.87 
Peru 2458  (1983-90)  0.69 
Philippines 1070 (1981-87) 0.49 
Portugal 8904  (1986-89)  0.46 
Senegal 562  (1988-91)  0.94 
Sierra Leone  260  (1990-97)  1.00 
Singapore 20079    0.71 
South Africa  3680  (1985)  0.77 
Sri Lanka  588  (1989-93)  0.86 
Swaziland 1254 (1995)  0.95 
Sweden 24845  (1990-93)  0.89 
Switzerland 42658    0.77 
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GDP per capita  Crisis Period    Concentration 
Thailand 1886 (1983-87, 1997)  0.54 
Togo 366  1.00 
Tunisia 1831  0.63 
Turkey 2451 (1982, 1991, 1994)  0.45 
United Kingdom  16883  0.57 
United States  24459 (1980-92) 0.19 
Uruguay 5037 (1981-85) 0.87 
Venezuela 3558 (1993-97) 0.52 
Zambia 464  0.84 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Summary statistics are presented in Panel A and correlations in Panel B and C.  Banking crisis is a crisis dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero 
otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  
M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral 
hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes.  Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of 
assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Banking freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking system.  Sources are given in the 
data appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics: 
Mean Median St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations
Banking crisis  0.04  0.00 0.20 1.00 0.00 1230
Real GDP Growth  3.41  3.45 4.25 23.60 -17.15 1216
Terms of trade change  0.15 
 
 
   
   
 
   
0.01 10.30 63.24 -51.45 1191
Real interest rate  1.58 2.68 19.34 151.21 -283.00 1160
Inflation 14.07  7.75 23.42 350.56 -29.17 1220
M2/reserves 19.87 6.56 68.86 1289.31 0.19 1222
Depreciation 0.10 0.04 0.22 2.62 -0.35 1238
Credit Growtht-2 6.01 5.09 15.84 115.42 -54.62 1203
Real GDP per capita  7813.94  2302.37 10299.92 45950.46 134.54 1222
Moral hazard  -1.09  -2.49 2.24 3.98 -2.49 1238
Concentration 0.72 0.77 0.21 1.00 0.19 1106
Banking freedom  3.36  3.00 0.88 5.00 1.00 1184
 
 




Real GDP  
growth 
Terms of  
trade change
Real interest 
rate  Inflation    M2/reserves Depreciation
Credit  
Growtht-2






Real  GDP  growth            -0.158***  1.000   
Terms  of  trade  change  -0.032            
         
        
           
               
               
               
             
             
                       
           
0.029 1.000
Real interest rate 
 
-0.079***  0.093***  -0.053*  1.000
Inflation 0.103***  -0.117***  0.043  -0.980***
 
  1.000
M2/reserves 0.094***  -0.117***  0.015 0.011 -0.017 1.000
Depreciation 0.171*** -0.194*** 0.002 -0.561***  0.642***  -0.035 1.000
Credit Growtht-2 -0.023 0.040 0.008 0.004 -0.015 -0.097***  -0.103***  1.000
Real GDP per capita  -0.090***  -0.084***  0.015  0.029 -0.051* -0.053* -0.226*** -0.014 1.000
Moral Hazard  0.078***  -0.004  0.030  0.028  -0.037 -0.058** -0.096***
 
-0.015 0.459*** 1.000
Concentration -0.062**  -0.061**  -0.004  0.004  -0.002 0.093*** 0.040 -0.054* -0.263*** -0.399*** 1.000
Banking  freedom
 
0.183*** 0.019 -0.012 0.018 -0.022 0.098*** 0.070** -0.020 -0.456*** -0.142*** 0.257***
 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 3.  Banking Crisis and Concentration 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + β5M2/reservesj,t + 
β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8 Real GDP per capitaj,t +β9 Average concentrationj,t+ β10 G10 countries,t +εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if 
there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is 
the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of 
change of the exchange rate.  G10 country is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for G10 countries and zero otherwise. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, 
calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Banking freedom measures the relative openness of the banking and financial 
system. Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997.  Specification (1) excludes all crisis observations after the initial year of crisis. Specification 
(2) includes the crisis periods (after the initial crisis year)  as crisis observations.  Specification (3) includes the crisis periods (after the initial crisis year) as non-crisis observations. In specification 
(4) Average Concentration is replaced by the Initial Concentration, and is restricted to the actual starting date and the years following that date. Specification (5) omits real GDP per capita.  
Specification  (6) includes G10 country dummy and its interaction with concentration.  White’s heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions 
and sources are given in the data appendix. 
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G10 countries    1.011
(2.332) 





No. of Crises  47  202  47  20  47  47 
No. of Observations  989  1144  1144  410  989  989 
%  crises correct  68  57  64  70  68  70 
% correct 73 66 67 76 72 72
Model χ
2 47.83*** 75*** 37.37*** 40.34*** 38.19*** 46.38***
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.   47
         
Table 4.  Banking Crisis, Regulation and Concentration 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + β5M2/reservesj,t + 
β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8 Concentrationj,t+  β9 Regulatory measurej,t +  εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the 
value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the growth rate of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  
M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  
Concentration equals the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Moral Hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with 
variations in deposit insurance design features. Fraction of entry denied measures the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the total received.  Activity restrictions captures bank’s 
ability to engage in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and in real estate investment, management, and development.  Required reserves is the percentage of 
reserves regulators require to hold. Capital regulatory index is a summary measure of capital stringency. Official Supervisory Power is an index of the power of supervisory agency to enforce 
prudential regulations on banks. State ownership is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned. Foreign ownership is the percentage of banking 
system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more foreign owned. Banking freedom is an indicator of relative openness of banking and financial system, while economic freedom is a composite of 10 
institutional factors determining economic freedom. KKZ_composite is an aggregate measure of six governance indicators. White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. The sample period is 1980-1997. 
              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Concentration -1.467**  -2.556* 



















Moral Hazard  0.037 
(0.075) 
          
         
        
             
                 
                 
               
                 
               
             
              
                       
                       
                       
                     
                     
Fraction of Entry Denied    1.885*** 
(0.737) 






Required  Reserves 0.016
(0.016) 
Capital  Regulatory  Index -0.079
(0.129) 
State  ownership 0.015*
(0.008) 
Foreign  ownership -0.005
(0.008) 
Banking  freedom -0.506***
(0.165) 





No.  of  Crises 47 21 34 34 27 33 32 31 47 47 47
No.  of  Observations 989 583 767 767 572 755 686 609 955 955 989
%    crises  correct
 
66 62 68 62 63 61 66 68 68 66 68
%    correct 71 81 79 78 77 79 74 73 70 70 72
Model χ
2 37.93*** 29.34*** 38.21*** 38*** 30.46*** 37.62*** 30.97*** 34.15*** 52.41*** 47.58*** 49.59***
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.   
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Table 5.  Banking Crisis and Concentration: Cost of Crises 
 
The Tobit model estimated takes the form: Cost of crisis[Country=j]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj+ β2 Terms of trade changej + β3 Real interest ratej + β4 Inflation j + β5M2/reservesj + β6Depreciationj  + 
β7 Credit growthj +β8 Moral hazard indexj + β9 Concentrationj + εj.   The dependent variables capture the fiscal cost of crisis.  In specification (1) we focus on one variation of the Klingebiel-
Honohan fiscal cost measure, while in specifications (2) focus is on the second variation of the Klingebiel-Honohan fiscal cost measure.  Specification (3) examines the Boyd and Smith measure of 
cost of crisis.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP 
deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  
Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the 
fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA.   White’s heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
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No. of obs.  47  49  69 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.    49
               
Table 6.  Banking Crisis and Concentration: Diversification vs. Ease of Supervision 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + β5M2/reservesj,t + 
β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 +β8 Real GDP per capita,t +β9 Moral hazard indexj,t + β10 Concentrationj,t + β11  Mean Bank Sizej,t+β12  No foreign loansj,t +  β13  GDPj,t + β14 No. of Banksj,t + 
β15  Activity Restrictionsj,t +  β16  Cashflow rightsj,t +εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the 
rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of 
M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of 
moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest 
banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997.  Mean Bank Size is given by average bank 
asset size (in billions of US dollars). No foreign loans takes the value one if banks are prohibited from investing abroad and 0 otherwise. GDP is real GDP in billions of  US$.   No. of banks is given 
in hundreds and Activity restrictions captures bank’s ability to engage in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and in real estate investment, management, and 
development.  Both are from Barth et al database.  Cashflow  is the fraction of a bank’s total cash-flow rights held by each bank’s main owner, averaged across each country’s banks (Caprio et al., 
2004). White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
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GDP ($)     0.0003  
(0.0002) 










No.  of Crises 47 47 34 34 34 34 29
No. of obs. 988 989 767 767 767 767 527
%  crises correct  68  72  65  62  62  68  72 
% correct 73 73 79 79 79 79 78
Model χ
2 48.36*** 48.79*** 49.43*** 43.90*** 43.90*** 43.43*** 48.31***
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.    50
 Data Appendix 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Banking crisis  Dummy takes on value of one during episodes identified as a 
systematic banking crises 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2001)  
Real GDP Growth  Rate of growth of real GDP  WDI (World Bank) 
Terms of trade change  Change in the terms of trade  WDI (World Bank) 
Real interest rate  Nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of 
inflation 
IFS (IMF)  
Inflation  Rate of change of GDP deflator  IFS (IMF) 
M2/reserves  Ratio of M2 to international reserves  IFS (IMF) 
Depreciation  Rate of depreciation  IFS (IMF) 
Credit growth  Rate of growth of real domestic credit to the private sector  IFS line 32d divided by GDP deflator  
GDP/CAP  Real GDP per capita  WDI (World Bank) 
GDP   Real GDP in billions of US dollars  WDI (World Bank) 
Moral hazard index  Principal component indicator measuring the generosity of 
deposit insurance, based on co-insurance, coverage of foreign 
currency and interbank deposits, type and source of funding, 
management, membership and level of explicit coverage. 
DD (2002)   
Concentration  Degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as 
the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks. Averaged 
over the 1988-97 period. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (2000) - Financial Structures Database 
Initial Concentration  Initial degree of concentration in the banking industry.   BankScope database. 
Mean Bank Size  Total banking assets divided by number of banks.   BankScope database. 
No Foreign Loans  Survey question 7.2 asks if banks are prohibited from making 
loans abroad (yes=1, no=0).   
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
No. of Banks  No. of banks in hundreds.  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Banking Freedom  Indicator of relative openness of  banking and financial system: 
specifically, whether the foreign banks and financial services 
firms are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open 
domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily 
regulated the financial system is, the presence of state-owned 
banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, 
and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance 
and invest in securities (and vice-versa).  The index ranges in 
value from 1 (very low – banks are primitive) to 5 (very high – 
few restrictions).  Averaged over 1995-97 period. 
 
Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation)   51
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Fraction of entry denied  Number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number 
of applications received from domestic and foreign entities 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of bank Regulation and Supervision 
Activity restrictions  Indicator of bank’s ability to engage in business of securities 
underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and in real 
estate investment, management, and development 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of bank Regulation and Supervision 
Required reserves  Ratio of reserves required to be held by banks  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Capital regulatory index  Summary measure of capital stringency: sum of overall and 
initial capital stringency.  Higher values indicate greater 
stringency. 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Official Supervisory Power  Principal component indicator of 14 dummy variables: 1.Does 
the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external 
auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 
2.Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the 
supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors 
or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 
3.Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for 
negligence? 4.Can the supervisory authority force a bank to 
change its internal organizational structure? 5.Are off-balance 
sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory 
agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute 
provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the 
supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: 
a) Dividends?  b) Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8.Can the 
supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration 
supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is 
insolvent? 9.Does the Banking Law give authority to the 
supervisory agency to  
intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem 
bank? 10.Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can 
the supervisory agency  
or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede 
shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) 
Remove and replace directors? 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) – Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
State ownership  Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or 
more government owned 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Foreign ownership  Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or 
more foreign owned 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision   52
Economic Freedom 
 
Composite of 10 institutional factors determining economic 
freedom: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government 
intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and 
foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, 
property rights, regulation, and black market activity. Individual 
factors are weighted equally to determine overall score of 
economic freedom.  A high score signifies an institutional or 
consistent set of policies that are most conducive to economic 
freedom, while a score close to 1 signifies a set of policies that 
are least conducive.  Averaged over 1995-97 period.  
 
Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) 
KK_composite Composite  of  six governance indicators (1998 data): voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption.  Individual factors 
are weighted equally to determine overall score of economic 
freedom.  Higher values correspond to better governance 
outcomes. 
 
Kaufman and Kray (2000/1) 
G10 countries  Dummy accounting for G10 country   
Growth GDP per capita  Rate of growth of real GDP per capita, averaged 1994-2001  WDI (World Bank)   53
 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Fee income  Ratio of non-interest income to total bank assets, averaged 1994-
2001. 
Bankscope database 
Total loan growth  Rate of growth of total loans, averaged 1994-2001.  Bankscope database 
Standard dev of GDP per capita  Standard deviation of real GDP per capita 
 
Calculated from real GDP per capita data taken from WDI (World Bank) 
Growth GDP per capita  Rate of growth of real GDP per capita, averaged 1994-2001  WDI (World Bank) 
Inflation
b Rate of change of consumer price index, averaged 1994-2001  IFS (IMF) 
Concentration
b   Degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the 
fraction of assets held by the three largest banks. Averaged over 




b Indicator of relative openness of  banking and financial system: 
specifically, whether the foreign banks and financial services 
firms are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open 
domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily 
regulated the financial system is, the presence of state-owned 
banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, 
and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance 
and invest in securities (and vice-versa).  The index ranges in 
value from 1 (very low – banks are primitive) to 5 (very high – 
few restrictions).  Averaged over 1994-2001 period. 
 
Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation), 2003 
Cashflow  Fraction of a bank’s total cash-flow rights held by each bank’s 
main owner, averaged across each country’s banks 
Caprio, Laeven and Levine (2004) 
 